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Abstract
Proofs of Retrievability (PoRs) are protocols which allow a client to store data remotely and to
efficiently ensure, via audits, that the entirety of that data is still intact. A dynamic PoR system
also supports efficient retrieval and update of any small portion of the data. We propose new, simple
protocols for dynamic PoR that are designed for practical efficiency, trading decreased persistent storage
for increased server computation, and show in fact that this tradeoff is inherent via a lower bound proof
of time-space for any PoR scheme. Notably, ours is the first dynamic PoR which does not require any
special encoding of the data stored on the server, meaning it can be trivially composed with any database
service or with existing techniques for encryption or redundancy. Our implementation and deployment
on Google Cloud Platform demonstrates our solution is scalable: for example, auditing a 1TB file takes
16 minutes at a monetary cost of just $0.23 USD. We also present several further enhancements, reducing
the amount of client storage, or the communication bandwidth, or allowing public verifiability, wherein
any untrusted third party may conduct an audit.
1 Introduction
1.1 The need for integrity checks
While various computing metrics have accelerated and slowed over the last half-century, one which undeniably
continues to grow quickly is data storage. One recent study estimated the world’s storage capacity at 4.4ZB
(4.4 · 1021), and growing at a rate of 40% per year [9]. Another study group estimates that by 2025, half of
the world’s data will be stored remotely, and half of that will be in public cloud storage [31].
As storage becomes more vast and more outsourced, users and organizations need ways to ensure the
integrity of their data – that the service provider continues to store it, in its entirety, unmodified. Customers
may currently rely on the reputations of large cloud companies like IBM Cloud or Amazon AWS, but even
those can suffer data loss events [2, 20], and as the market continues to grow, new storage providers without
such long-standing reputations need cost-effective ways to convince customers their data is intact.
This need is especially acute for the growing set of decentralized storage networks (DSNs), such as Filecoin,
Storj, SAFE Network, Sia, and PPIO, that act to connect users who need their data stored with providers
(“miners”) who will be paid to store users’ data. In DSNs, integrity checks are useful at two levels: from the
customer who may be wary of trusting blockchain-based networks, and within the network to ensure that
storage nodes are actually providing their promised service. Furthermore, storage nodes whose sole aim is to
earn cryptocurrency payment have a strong incentive to cheat, perhaps by deleting user data or thwarting
audit mechanisms.
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1.2 Existing solutions
The research community has developed a wide array of solutions to the remote data integrity problem over
the last 15 years. Here we merely summarize the main lines of work and highlight some shortcomings that
this paper seeks to address; see Section 7 for a more complete discussion and comparison.
Provable Data Possession (PDP). PDP audits [24, 16, 35, 37] are practically efficient methods to
ensure that a large fraction of data has not been modified. They generally work by computing a small tag
for each block of stored data, then randomly sampling a subset of data blocks and corresponding tags, and
computing a check over that subset.
Because a server that has lost or deleted a constant fraction of the file will likely be unable to pass an
audit, PDPs are useful in detecting catastrophic or unintentional data loss. They are also quite efficient
in practice. However, a server who deletes only a few blocks is still likely to pass an audit, so the security
guarantees are not complete, and may be inadequate for critical data storage or possibly-malicious providers.
Proof of Retrievability (PoR). PoR audits, starting with [5], have typically used techniques such as
error-correcting codes, and more recently Oblivious RAM (ORAM), in order to obscure from the server
where pieces of the file are stored [27, 13]. Early PoR schemes did not provide an efficient update mechanism
to alter individual data blocks, but more recent dynamic schemes have overcome this shortcoming [34, 10].
A successful PoR audit provides a strong guarantee of retrievability: if the server altered many blocks,
this will be detected with high probability, whereas if only few blocks were altered or deleted, then the error
correction means the file can still likely be recovered. Therefore, a single successful audit ensures with high
probability that the entire file is still stored by the server.
The downside of this stronger guarantee is that PoRs have typically used more sophisticated cryptographic
tools than PDPs, and in all cases we know of require multiple times the original data size for persistent remote
storage. This is problematic from a cost standpoint: if a PoR based on ORAM requires perhaps 10x storage
on the cloud, this cost may easily overwhelm the savings cloud storage promises to provide.
Proof of Replication (PoRep) and others. While our work mainly falls into the PoR/PDP setting, it
also has applications to more recent and related notions of remote storage proofs.
Proofs of space were originally proposed as an alternative to the computation-based puzzles in blockchains
and anti-abuse mechanisms [4, 14], and require verifiable storage of a large amount of essentially-random
data. These are not applicable to cloud storage, where the data must obviously not be random.
A PoRep scheme (sometimes called Proof of Data Reliability) aims to combine the ideas of proof of space
and PoR/PDP in order to prove that multiple copies of a data file are stored remotely. This is important
as, for example, a client may pay for 3x redundant storage to prevent data loss, and wants to make sure
that three actual copies are stored in distinct locations. Some PoRep schemes employ slow encodings and
time-based audit checks; the idea is that a server does not have enough time to re-compute the encoding on
demand when an audit is requested, or even to retrieve it from another server, and so must actually store
the (redundantly) encoded file [3, 18, 38, 11]. The Filecoin network employs this type of verification. A
different and promising approach, not based on timing assumptions, has recently been proposed by [12]. An
important property of many recent PoRep schemes is public verifiability, that is, the ability for a third party
(without secrets) to conduct an audit. This is crucial especially for distributed storage networks (DSNs).
Most relevant for the current paper is that most of these schemes directly rely on an underlying PDP or
PoR in order to verify encoded replica storage. For example, [12] states that their protocol directly inherits
any security and efficiency properties of the underlying PDP or PoR.
We also point out that, in contrast to our security model, many of these works are based on a rational
actor model, where it is not in a participant’s financial interest to cheat, but a malicious user may break this
guarantee, and furthermore that most existing PoRep schemes do not support dynamic updates to individual
data blocks.
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1.3 Our Contributions
We present a new proof of retrievability which has the following advantages compared to existing PDPs and
PoRs:
Near-optimal persistent storage. The best existing PoR protocols that we could find require between
2N and 10N bytes of cloud storage to support audits of an N -byte data file, making these schemes impractical
in many settings. Our new PoR requires only N +O(N/ logN) persistent storage.
Simple cryptographic building blocks. Our basic protocol relies only on small-integer arithmetic and
a collision-resistant hash function, making it very efficient in practice. Indeed, we demonstrate in practice
that 1TB of data can be audited in 16 minutes at a monetary cost of just 0.23 USD.
Efficient partial retrievals and updates. That is, our scheme is a dynamic PoR, suitable to large
applications where the user does not always wish to re-download the entire file.
Provable retrievability from malicious servers. Similar to the best PoR protocols, our scheme
supports data recovery (extraction) via rewinding audits. This means, in particular, that there is only a
negligible chance that a server can pass a single audit and yet not recover the entirety of stored data.
(Nearly) stateless clients. With the addition of a symmetric cipher, the client(s) in our protocol need
only store a single decryption key and hash digest, which means multiple clients may easily share access
(audit responsibility) on the same remote data store.
Public verifiability. We show an extension to our protocol, based on the difficulty of discrete logarithms
in some group, that allows any third party to conduct audits with no shared secret.
Importantly, because our protocols store the data unencoded on the server, they can trivially be used
within or around any existing encryption or duplication scheme, including most PoRep constructions. We
can also efficiently support arbitrary server-side applications, such as databases or file systems with their
own encoding needs.
The main drawback of our schemes is that, compared to existing PoRs, they have a higher asymptotic
complexity for server-side computation during audits, and (in some cases) higher communication bandwidth
during audits as well. However, we also provide a time-space lower bound that proves any PoR scheme must
make a tradeoff between persistent space and audit computation time.
Furthermore, we demonstrate with a complete implementation and deployment on Google Compute
Platform that the tradeoff we make is highly beneficial in cloud settings. Intuitively, a user must pay for the
computational cost of audits only when they are actually happening, maybe a few times a day, whereas the
extra cost of (say) 5x persistent storage must be paid all the time, whether the client is performing audits or
not.
1.4 Organization
The rest of the paper is structured as follows:
• Section 2 defines our security model, along the lines of most recent PoR works.
• Section 3 contains our proof of an inherent time-space tradeoff in any PoR scheme.
• Section 4 gives an overview and description of our basic protocol, with detailed algorithms and security
proofs delayed until Section 6.
• Section 5 discusses the results of our open-source implementation and deployment on Google Compute
Platform.
• Section 7 gives a detailed comparison with prior work.
2 Security model
We define a dynamic PoR scheme as consisting of the following five algorithms between a client C with state
stC and a server S with state stS . Our definition is the same as given by [34], except that we follow [24] and
include the Extract algorithm in the protocol explicitly.
A subtle but important point to note is that, unlike the first four algorithms, Extract is not really
intended to be used in practice. In typical usage, a cooperating and honest server will pass all audits, and
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the normal Read algorithm would be used to retrieve any or all of the data file reliably. The purpose of
Extract is mostly to prove that the data is recoverable by a series of random, successful audits, and hence
that the server which has deleted even one block of data has negligible chance to pass a single audit.
The client may use random coins for any algorithm; at a minimum, the Audit algorithm must be ran-
domized in order to satisfy retrievability non-trivially.
• (stC , stS) ← Init(1λ, b,M): On input of the security parameter λ and the database M , consisting of
N bits arranged in blocks of b bits, outputs the client state stC and the server state stS .
• {mi, reject} ← Read(i, stC , stS): On input of an index i ∈ 1..dN/be, the client state stC and the server
state stS , outputs mi = M [i] or reject.
• {(st′C , st′S), reject} ← Write(i, a, stC , stS): On input of an index i ∈ 1..dN/be, data a, the client state
stC and the server state stS , outputs a new client state st′C and a new server state st
′
S , such that now
M [i] = a, or reject.
• {pi, reject} ← Audit(stC , stS) : On input of the client state stC and the server state stS , outputs a
succesful transcript pi or reject.
• M ← Extract(stC , pi1, pi2, . . . , pie): On input of independent Audit transcripts pi1, . . . , pie, outputs the
database M . The number of required transcripts e must be a polynomially-bounded function of N , b,
and λ.
2.1 Correctness
A correct execution of the algorithms by honest client and server results in audits being accepted and reads
to recover the last updated value of the database. More formally, correctness is:
Definition 1 (Correctness). For any parameters λ,N, b, there exists a predicate IsValid such that, for any
database M of N bits, IsValid(M, Init(1λ, b,M)). Furthermore, for any state such that IsValid(M, stC , stS)
and any index i with 0 ≤ i < dN/be, we have
• Read(i, stC , stS) = M [i];
• IsValid(M ′, Write(i, a, stC , stS)), where M ′[i] = a and the remaining M ′[j] = M [j] for every j 6= i;
• Audit(stC , stS) 6= reject;
• For e audits Audit1, . . . , Audite with independent randomness, with probability 1− negl(λ):
Extract(stC , Audit1(stC , stS), . . . , Audite(stC , stS))=M .
Note that, even though C may use random coins in the algorithms, a correct PoR by this definition should
have no chance of returning reject in any Read, Write or Audit with an honest client and server.
2.2 Authenticity and attacker model
The authenticity requirement stipulates that the client can always detect (except with negligible probability)
if any message sent by the server deviates from honest behavior. We use the following game between an
observer O, a potentially malicious server S¯ and an honest server S for the adaptive version of authenticity,
with the same game as [34]:
1. S¯ chooses an initial memory M . O runs Init and sends the initial memory layout stS to both S¯ and S.
2. For a polynomial number of steps t = 1, 2, ..., poly(λ), S¯ picks an operation opt where operation opt is
either Read, Write or Audit. O executes the operations with both S¯ and S.
3. S¯ is said to win the game, if any message sent by S¯ differs from that of S and O did not output reject.
Definition 2 (Authenticity). A PoR scheme satisfies adaptive authenticity, if no polynomial-time adversary
S¯ has more than negligible probability in winning the above security game.
2.3 Retrievability
Intuitively, the retrievability requirement stipulates that whenever a malicious server can pass the audit test
with high probability, the server must know the entire memory contents M . To model this, [10] use a black-
box rewinding access: from the state of the server before any passed audit, there must exist an extractor
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algorithm that can reconstruct the complete correct database. As in [34], we insist furthermore that the
extractor does not use the complete server state, but only the transcripts from successful audits. In the
following game, note that the observer O running the honest client algorithms may only update its state
stC during Write algorithm, and hence the Audit algorithms are independently randomized from the client
side, but we make no assumptions about the state of the adversary S¯.
1. S¯ chooses an initial database M . O runs Init and sends the initial memory layout stS to S¯;
2. For t = 1, 2, ..., poly(λ), the adversary S¯ adaptively chooses an operation opt where opt is either Read,
Write or Audit. The observer executes the respective algorithms with S¯, updating stC and M according
to the Write operations specified;
3. The observer runs 2e Audit algorithms with S¯ and records the outputs pi1, . . . , pie′ of those which did
not return reject, where 0 ≤ e′ ≤ 2e.
4. The adversary S¯ is said to with the game if e′ ≥ e and Extract(stC , pi1, . . . , pie) 6= M .
Definition 3 (Retrievability). A PoR scheme satisfies retrievability if no polynomial-time adversary S¯ has
more than negligible probability in winning the above security game.
3 Time-space tradeoff lower bound
As we have seen, the state of the art in Proofs of Retrievability schemes consists of some approaches with a
low audit cost but a high storage overhead (e.g., [24, 34, 10]) and some schemes with a low storage overhead
but high computational cost for the server during audits (e.g., [5, 32, 33]).
Before presenting our own constructions (which fall into the latter category) we prove that there is indeed
an inherent tradeoff in any PoR scheme between the amount of extra storage and the cost of performing
audits. By extra storage here we mean exactly the number of extra bits of persistent memory, on the client
or server, beyond the bit-length of the original database being represented.
Theorem 4 below shows that, for any PoR scheme with sub-linear audit cost, we have
(extra storage size) · audit cost
log(audit cost)
∈ Ω(data size).
None of the previous schemes, nor those which we present, make this lower bound tight. Nonetheless,
it demonstrates that a “best of all possible worlds” scheme with, say, O(
√
N) extra storage and O(logN)
audit cost to store an arbitrary N -bit database, is impossible.
The proof is by contradiction, presenting an attack on an arbitrary PoR scheme which does not satisfy
the claimed time/space lower bound. Our attack consists of flipping k randomly-chosen bits of the storage.
First we show that k is small enough so that the audit probably does not examine any of the flipped bits,
and still passes. Next we see that k is large enough so that, for some choice of the N bits being represented,
flipping k bits will, with high probability, make it impossible for any algorithm to correctly recover the
original data. This is a contradiction, since the audit will pass even though the data is lost.
Readers familiar with coding theory will notice that the second part of the proof is similar to Hamming’s
bound for the minimal distance of a block code. Indeed, we can view the original N -bit data as a message,
and the storage using s+ c extra bits of memory as an (N + s+ c)-bit codeword. A valid PoR scheme must
be able to extract (decode) the original message from an (N + s+ c)-bit string, or else should fail any audit.
Theorem 4 (Appendix A). Consider any Proof of Retrievability scheme which stores an arbitrary database
of N bits, uses at most N + s bits of persistent memory on the server, c bits of persistent memory on the
client, and requires at most t steps to perform an audit. Assuming s ≥ 0, then either t > N4 , or
(s+ c)
t
log2 t
≥ N
12
.
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4 Retrievability via verifiable computing
We first present a simple version of our PoR protocol. This version contains the main ideas of our approach,
namely, using matrix-vector products during audits to prove retrievability. It also makes use of Merkle hash
trees during reads and updates to ensure authenticity.
This protocol uses only N + o(N) persistent server storage, which is an improvement to the O(N)
persistent storage of existing PoR schemes, and is the main contribution of this work. The costs of our
Read and Write algorithms are similar to existing work, but we incur an asymptotically higher cost for
the Audit algorithm, namely O(
√
N) communication bandwidth and O(N) server computation time. We
demonstrate in the next section that this tradeoff between persistent storage and Audit cost is favorable in
cloud computing settings for realistic-size databases.
Later, in Section 6, we give a more general protocol and prove it secure according to the PoR definition
in Section 2. That generalized version shows how to achieve O(1) persistent client storage with the same
costs, or alternatively to trade arbitrarily small communication bandwidth during Audits for increased client
persistent storage and computation time.
4.1 Overview
A summary of our four algorithms is shown in Table 1, where dashed boxes are the classical, Merkle hash
tree authenticated, remote read/write operations.
Our idea is to use verifiable computing schemes as, e.g., proposed in [17]. Our choice for this is to treat
the data as a square matrix of dimension roughly
√
N × √N . This allows for the matrix multiplication
verification described in [19] to be used as a computational method for the audit algorithm.
Crucially, this does not require any additional metadata; the database M is stored as-is on disk, our
algorithm merely treats the machine words of this unmodified data as a matrix stored in row-major order.
Although the computational complexity for the Audit algorithm is asymptotically O(N) for the server, this
entails only a single matrix-vector multiplication, in contrast to some prior work which requires expensive
RSA computations [5].
To ensure authenticity also during Read and Write operations, we combine this linear algebra idea above
with a standard Merkle hash tree.
4.2 Matrix based approach for audits
The basic premise of our particular PoR is to treat the data, consisting of N bits organized in machine
words, as a matrix M ∈ Rm×nq , where Rq is a suitable finite ring of size q. Crucially, the choice of ring Rq
detailed below does not require any modification to the raw data itself; that is, any element of the matrix
M can be retrieved in O(1) time. At a high level, our audit algorithm follows the matrix multiplication
verification technique of [19].
In the Init algorithm, the Client chooses a secret random control vector u ∈ Rmq and computes a second
secret control vector v ∈ Rnq according to
vᵀ = uᵀM. (1)
Note that u is held constant for the duration of the storage. This does not compromise security because
no message which depends on u is ever sent to the Server. In particular, this means that multiple clients
could use different, independent, control vectors u as long as they have a way to synchronize Write operations
(modifications of their shared database) over a secure channel.
To perform an audit, the client chooses a random challenge vector x ∈ Rnq , and asks the server to compute
a response vector y ∈ Rmq according to
y = Mx (2)
Upon receiving the response y, the client checks two dot products for equality, namely
uᵀy ?= vᵀx. (3)
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Table 1: Client/server PoR protocol with low storage server
Server Communications Client
Init
N = mn log2 q u
$← Rmq
vᵀ ← uᵀM.
MTInit
←− λ, b,M
M, TM ←− −→ rM
Stores M and TM Stores u,v, and rM
Read
M, TM −→
MTVerifiedRead
←− i, j, rM
−→Mij
Returns Mij
Write
M, TM −→
MTVerifiedWrite
←− i, j,M′ij , rM
M′, T ′M ←− −→Mij , r′M
v′i ← vi + (M′ij −Mij)uj
Stores updated M′, T ′M Stores updated r
′
M,v
′
Audit
x←− x $← Rnq
y←Mx y−→ uᵀy ?= vᵀx
The proof of retrievability will rely on the fact that observing several successful audits allows, with high
probability, recovery of the matrix M, and therefore of the entire database.
The audit algorithm’s cost is mostly in the server’s matrix-vector product. The client’s dot products are
much cheaper in comparison. For instance if m = n are close to
√
N , the communication cost is bounded by
O(
√
N) as each vector has about
√
N values. We trade this infrequent heavy computation for no additional
persistent storage, justified by the significantly cheaper cost of computation versus storage space.
A sketch of the security proofs is as follows; full proofs are provided along with our formal and general
protocol in Section 6. The Client knows that the Server sent the correct value of y with high probability,
because otherwise the Server must know something about the secret control vector u chosen randomly at
initialization time. This is impossible since no data depending on u was ever sent to the Server. The
retrievability property (Definition 3) is ensured from the fact that, after
√
N random successful audits, with
high probability, the original data M is the unique solution to the matrix equation MX = Y, where X is
the matrix of random challenge vectors in the audits and Y is the matrix of corresponding response vectors
from the Server.
Some similar ideas were used by [32] for checking integrity. However, their security relies on the difficulty
of integer factorization. Implementation would therefore require many modular exponentiations at thousands
of bits of precision. Our approach for audits is much simpler and independent of computational hardness
assumptions.
4.3 Merkle hash tree for updates
While the audit operates on the data in word-size chunks as members of a finite ring Rq, retrieving data is
done at the byte level with support for retrieving any range of bytes (that is legal with the size of the data).
A Merkle hash tree with block size b is used here to ensure authenticity of individual Read operations. This
is a binary tree, stored on the server, consisting of O(N/b) hashes, each of size 2λ for collision resistance.
The Client stores only the root hash, and can perform, with high integrity assurance, any read or write
operation on a range of k bytes in O(k + b + log(N/b)) communication and computation time. When the
block size is large enough, the extra server storage is o(N); for example, b ≥ logN means the hash tree can
be stored using O(Nλ/ logN) bits.
7
Merkle hash trees are a classical result, commonly used in practice, and we do not claim any novelty in
our use here [28, 26]. To that end, we provide three algorithms to abstract the details of the Merkle hash
tree, and give more details on a possible implementation in Appendix C.
These are all two-party protocols between a Server and a Client, but without any requirement for secrecy.
A vertical bar | in the inputs and/or outputs of an algorithm indicates Server input/output on the left, and
Client input/output on the right. When only the Client has input/output, the bar is omitted for brevity.
The MTVerifiedRead and MTVerifiedWrite algorithms may both fail to verify a hash, and if so, the
Client outputs reject and aborts immediately. Our three Merkle tree algorithms are as follows.
MTInit(1λ, b,M) 7→ (M,TM | rM ). The Client initializes database M for storage in size-b blocks. The
entire database M is sent to the Server, who computes hashes and stores the resulting Merkle hash tree
TM . The Client also computes this tree, but discards all hashes other than the root hash rM . The cost in
communication and computation for both parties is bounded by O(|M |) = O(N).
MTVerifiedRead(M,TM | range, rM ) 7→ Mrange. The Client sends a contiguous byte range to the
server, i.e., a pair of indices within the size of M . This range determines which containing range of blocks
are required, and sends back these block contents, along with left and right boundary paths in the hash tree
TM . Specifically, the boundary paths include all left sibling hashes along the path from the first block to
the root node, and all right sibling hashes along the path from the last block to the root; these are called
the “uncles” in the hash tree. Using the returned blocks and hash tree values, the Client reconstructs the
Merkle tree root, and compares with rM . If these do not match, the Client outputs reject and aborts.
Otherwise, the requested range of bytes is extracted from the (now-verified) blocks and returned. The cost
in communication and computation time for both parties is at most O(|range|+ b+ log(N/b)).
MTVerifiedWrite(M,TM | range,M ′range, rM )
7→ (M ′, T ′M |Mrange, r′M ).
The Client wishes to update the data M ′range in the specified range, and receive the previous value of that
range, Mrange, as well as an updated root hash rM . The algorithm begins as MTVerifiedRead with the
Server sending all blocks to cover the range and corresponding left and right boundary hashes from TM . After
the Client retrieves and verifies the old value Mrange with the old root hash rM , she updates the blocks with
the new value M ′range and uses the same boundary hashes to compute the new root hash r
′
M . Separately,
the Server updates the underlying database M ′ in the specified range, then recomputes all affected hashes
in T ′M . The asymptotic cost is identical to that for the MTVerifiedRead algorithm.
5 Experiments with Google cloud services
As we have seen, compared to other dynamic PoR schemes, our protocol aims at achieving the high security
guarantees of PoR, while trading near-minimal persistent server storage for increased audit computation
time.
In order to address the practicality of this tradeoff, we implemented and tested our PoR protocol using
virtual machines and disks on the Google Cloud Platform service, a commercial competitor to Amazon Web
Services, Microsoft Azure, and the like.
Specifically, we address two primary questions:
• What is the monetary cost and time required to perform our O(N) time audit on a large database?
• How does the decreased cost of persistent storage trade-off with increase costs for computation during
audits?
Our experimental results are summarized in Tables 3 to 5. For a 1TB data file, the O(
√
N) communication
cost of our audit entails less than 12MB of data transfer, and our implementation executes the O(N) audit
for this 1TB data file in less than 16 minutes and for a monetary cost of less than $0.25 USD.
By contrast, just the extra persistent storage required by other existing PoR schemes would cost at least
$40 USD or as much as $200 USD per month, not including any computation costs for audits. These results
lead to two tentative conclusions:
• The communication and computation costs of our Audit algorithm are not prohibitive in practice
despite their unfavorable asymptotics; and
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• Our solution is the most cost-efficient PoR scheme available when few audits are performed per day.
We also emphasize again that a key benefit to our PoR scheme is its composability with existing software,
as the data file is left in-tact as a normal file on the Server’s filesystem.
The remainder of this section gives the full details of our implementation and experimental setup. The
source code is available via the following github repository: https://github.com/dsroche/la-por
5.1 Parameter selection
To balance the bandwidth (protocol communications) and the client computation costs, we chose to rep-
resent M as a square matrix with dimensions m = n =
√
N/8, where the 8 comes from our choice of Rq
corresponding to 64-bit words (see Section 5.2). The resulting asymptotic costs for these parameter choices
are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Proof of retrievability via square matrix verifiable computing
Server Comm. Client
Storage N + o(N) O(
√
N)
C
o
m
p
u
t. Init O(N) N O(N)
Audit O(N) O(
√
N) O(
√
N)
Read/Write O(log(N)) O(log(N)) O(log(N))
5.2 Two Prime Calculations
In order to leave the data file unmodified in persistent storage, while allowing constant-time random access
to individual matrix elements, we break the data into word-sized (8 byte) blocks, and choose a finite ring
Rq with q ≥ 264.
One possibility would be to set q as a prime larger than 264, but this would entail costly multiple-
precision computations for the modular arithmetic. Instead, we chose the ring Rq = Fp1 × Fp2 as the direct
product of two finite fields, each of large prime order. When q = p1p2 ≥ 264, this ensures unique recovery
of the database from images in Rq via Chinese remaindering, and also allows efficient computation without
extended precision.
In our implementation, we chose p1 = 2
31 − 1 and p2 = 236 − 5. That p1 is a Mersenne prime makes
computations with it particularly efficient, but a second Mersenne prime of similar size does not exist. For
the actual arithmetic we used the low-level routines provided by the open-source high performance number
theory library Flint [21].
This two-prime setup is equivalent to storing two databases M1 and M2 in finite fields Fp1 and Fp2
respectively, and so the formal security proof of Theorem 6 applies as long as the smaller prime p1 is larger
than the column dimension n of the database matrix M (see Section 6 for more details). This means our
implementation parameters satisfy the security proof requirements for sizes up to N = 144PB.
5.3 Experimental Design
Our implementation provides the Init, Read, Write, and Audit algorithms as described in the previous
section, including the Merkle hash tree implementation for read/write integrity. As the cost of the first three
of these are comparable to prior work, we focused our experiments on the Audit algorithm.
We ran two sets of experiments, using virtual machines and disks on Google Cloud’s Compute Engine∗.
The client machine was a basic f1-micro instance, 1 vCPU with 0.6GB memory. The server machine was
an n1-standard-2, 2 vCPU with 7.5GB memory. In the second set of experiments, the 4/16 parallel VMs
running MPI were all n1-standard-1 instances with 1 vCPU and 3.75GB memory. The client and server
∗https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/machine-types.
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processes communicated over TCP connection. The data itself was stored on an attached 1.2TB standard
persistent disk. Test files of size 1GB, 10GB, 100GB, and 1TB were generated with random bytes from
/dev/urandom. The server time in Table 3 measures CPU time only; all other times are “wall time” in
actual seconds for operation completion.
5.4 Audit compared to checksums
For the first set of experiments, we wanted to address the question of how “heavy” the hidden constant in
the O(N) is. For this, we compared the cost of performing a single audit, on databases of various sizes, to
the cost of computing a cryptographic checksum of the entire database using MD5 or SHA256.
Table 3: Run Time Test Results (seconds)
Operation 1GB 10GB 100GB 1TB
Init
Server 0.81 47.38 483.16 5236.65
Wall 11.17 102.49 1055.46 11437.00
Audit
Server 5.53 54.26 463.25 5510.80
Wall 12.75 117.36 1080.66 11495.00
MD5
Server 2.46 23.92 251.31 2848.21
Wall 8.91 88.47 914.91 9234.00
SHA256
Server 6.30 62.67 639.08 6428.22
Wall 11.49 112.72 1553.74 11969.00
In a sense, a cryptographic checksum is another means of integrity check that requires no extra storage,
albeit without the malicious server protection that our PoR protocol provides. Therefore, having an audit
cost which is comparable to that of a cryptographic checksum indicates the O(N) theoretical cost is not too
heavy in practice.
The experiment took place in 4 stages. First, each file was run through the initialization algorithm.
Then, each file was run through the Audit algorithm. Third, an MD5 digest was calculated for each file.
Finally, a SHA256 digest was computed for each file. A Merkle tree was also created over each file. Instead
of scaling the block size to each file, a block size of 8KiB was chosen for practical performance. The results
are organized into Table 3.
Per operation, the timings report the CPU time from the server side, and the total wall time from the
client side. The difference is due mostly to I/O overhead; even for the audit, the client-side work to compute
the two dot products is minimal.
There are two main conclusions to draw from the experiments. The first deals with our Audit algorithm
following the theoretical bounds that were expected, and the second deals with how the run time compares
to that of the hash functions.
Because the server computation time for an audit is O(N), we expect the times to scale linearly, and our
results support this. We also see that the running time is consistently between that of MD5 and SHA256
checksums, both in wall time and CPU time. This justifies the fact that the O(N) time Audit algorithm,
while more costly than other PoR and PDP schemes, is comparable to that of computing a cryptographic
checksum.
We were surprised by the large disparity between the Server Time and the Wall Time in these experiments,
both for our own Audit algorithm and for the checksum comparisons. We determined that this disparity
is mostly due to I/O within the cloud datacenter, caused by the CPU waiting for the reads to the external
drive.
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5.5 Parallel audits using MPI
Our first round of experiments indicated that our Audit algorithm on the server was I/O bound, despite
the favorable linear access pattern of the matrix-vector product computation. It seems that Google Cloud
Platform throttles disk-to-VM I/O on a per-VM basis, so that even with many cores, the situation did not
improve.
However, we were able to achieve good parallel speedup when running the Audit algorithm over multiple
VMs in parallel using MPI. In this setup, the server VM waits for a connection from a client, who requests
an audit, which is in turn performed by some number of VMs running in parallel, after which the results
are collected and returned to the client. The simplicity of our Audit algorithm makes it trivially paral-
lelizable, where each parallel VM performs the matrix-vector product on a contiguous subset of rows of M,
corresponding to a contiguous segment of the underlying file.
Because the built-in MD5 and SHA256 checksum programs do not achieve any parallel speedup, we
focused only on our Audit algorithm for this set of experiments using MPI. The results are reported in
Table 4. Our parallel speedup is not quite linear, but was sufficient to gain a significant improvement in the
audit time, to just under 16 minutes in the case of a 1TB file using 16 VMs.
We also used these times to measure the total cost of running each audit in Google Cloud Platform,
which features per-second billing of VMs and persistent disks, as reported in Table 4 as well. Note that
the monetary cost for increasing parallel VMs is slightly decreasing for larger file sizes, indicating that even
higher levels of parallelization may decrease the running time even further with no extra monetary cost.
Table 4: Multiple Machine Parallelization Results
VMs Metric 1GB 10GB 100GB 1TB
1
Audit (s) 12.75 117.36 1080.66 11495.00
Speedup 1x 1x 1x 1x
Cost $0.0004 $0.0031 $0.0285 $0.3033
4
Audit (s) 3.99 46.28 430.29 3512.33
Speedup 3.19x 2.54x 2.51x 3.27x
Cost $0.0003 $0.0037 $0.0341 $0.2781
16
Audit (s) 3.63 14.34 117.92 946.74
Speedup 3.51x 8.18x 9.16x 12.14x
Cost $0.0009 $0.0034 $0.0280 $0.2249
5.6 Communication and client computation time
Besides the O(N) complexity for server computation during an audit, the O(
√
N) cost of client computa-
tion and communication bandwidth in our scheme is also asymptotically worse than existing PoR schemes.
However, our experiments suggest that in practice these are not significant factors.
The time it took the client to compute the two dot products to finish the audit never took more than
0.12 seconds in any case tested. This indicates that even low-powered client machines should be able to run
this Audit algorithm without issue.
The time spent communicating the challenge and response vectors, x and y, becomes insignificant in
comparison to the server computation as the size of the database increases. In the case of our experiments,
Table 5 summarizes that communication time of both x and y remains under five seconds. The amount of
data communicated is also given to confirm the square root scaling.
Our experiments had both the client and server (with associated added VMs) co-located in the us-
central1-a zone (listed geographically as Iowa), meaning that the communication is likely within the same
physical datacenter. We hope to address this in future work with geographically diverse clients; however,
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Table 5: Amount of Communication Per Audit with 16 VMs
Metric 1GB 10GB 100GB 1TB
Comm. (kB) 358 1131 3578 11314
Time (s) 2.05 1.68 3.87 4.04
the small amount of data being transferred indicates that this will still not have a significant affect on the
overall audit time.
Again, we emphasize that the main benefit of our approach is the vastly decreased persistent storage
compared to existing PoR schemes. Including the Merkle tree with block size of 8KiB, the total storage
overhead is only 1.0684x file size. Using Google Cloud with a 1TB database, the cost for a 1.069TB Standard
Persistent Disk per month is $42.76. Running our Audit algorithm with 16 VMs every five hours would still
be financially favorable compared to using a PoR scheme with just 2x storage overhead.
6 Formalization and Security analysis
In this section we present our PoR protocol in most general form, prove it satisfies the definitions of PoR
correctness, authenticity, and retrievability, analyze its asymptotic performance and present a variant that
also satisfies public verifiability.
6.1 Additional improvements on the control vectors
The control vectors u and v stored by the Client in the simplified protocol from Section 4 can be modified
to increase security and decrease persistent storage or communications.
6.1.1 Ensuring security assumptions via multiple checks
In order to reach a target bound 2−λ on the probability of failure for the authenticity, it might be necessary
to choose multiple independent u vectors during initialization and repeat the audit checks with each one.
First, to ease independence considerations we forget the two prime ring and consider instead that tests are
performed in Fq, a finite field of size q. Second, we model multiple vectors by inflating the vectors u and v
to be blocks of t non-zero vectors instead; that is, matrices U and V with t rows each. To see how large
t needs to be, consider the probability of the Client accepting an incorrect response during an audit. An
incorrect answer z to the audit fails to be detected only if
U · (z− y) = 0, (4)
where y = Mx is the correct response which would be returned by an honest Server.
If U is sampled uniformly at random among matrices in Ft×mq with non-zero rows, then since the Server
never learns any information about U, audit fails only if the Server can guess a vector in the right nullspace
of U. This happens with probability at most 1/qt.
Achieving a probability bounded by 2−λ, requires to set t =
⌈
λ
log2(q)
⌉
. In practice, reasonable values of
λ = 128 and q > 264 mean that t ≤ 2 in this case.
6.1.2 Random geometric progression
Instead of using uniformly random vectors x and matrices U, one can impose a structure on them, in order
to reduce the amount of randomness needed, and the cost of communicating or storing them. We propose
to apply Kimbrel and Sinha’s modification of Freivalds’ check [25]: select a single random field element ρ
and form xᵀ = [ρ, . . . , ρn], thus reducing the communication volume for an audit from m+ n to m+ 1 field
elements.
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Similarly, we can reduce the storage of U by sampling uniformly at random t distinct non-zero elements
s1, . . . , st and forming
U =
[
s1 ··· sm1
...
...
st ··· smt
]
∈ Ft×mq . (5)
This reduces the storage on the client side from mt+ n to only t+ n field elements.
Then with a rectangular database and n > m, communications can be potentially lowered to any small
target amount, at the cost of increased client storage and greater client computation during audits.
This impacts the probability of failure of the authenticity for the audits. Consider an incorrect answer
z to an audit as in (4). Then each element s1, . . . , st is a root of the degree-(m − 1) univariate polynomial
whose coefficients are z − y. Because this polynomial has at most m − 1 distinct roots, the probability of
the Client accepting an incorrect answer is at most(
m−1
t
)(
q
t
) ≤ (m
q
)t
,
which leads to setting t =
⌈
λ
log2(q)−log2(m)
⌉
in order to bound this probability by 2−λ. Even if N = 1015 for
1PB of storage, assuming m ≤ n, and again using λ = 128, gives t ≤ 4.
6.1.3 Externalized storage
Lastly, the client storage can be reduced to O(λ) by externalizing the storage of the block-vector V at the
expense of increasing the volume of communication. Clearly V must be stored encrypted, as otherwise the
server could answer any challenge without having to store the database. Any IND-CPA symmetric cipher
works here, with care taken so that a separate IV is used for each column; this allows updates to a column
of V during a Write operation without revealing anything about the updated values.
We will simply assume that the client has access to an encryption function E and a decryption function
D. In order to assess the authenticity of each communication of V from the Server to the client, we will use
another Merkle-Hash tree certificate for it: the client will only need to keep the root of a Merkle-Tree built
on the encryption of V.
Since this modification reduces the client storage but increases the overall communication, both options
(with or without it; extern=T or extern=F) should be considered, and we will state the algorithms for our
protocol with a Strategy parameter, deciding whether or not to externalize the storage of V.
Table 6: Proof of retrievability via rectangular verifiable computing with structured vectors
(N = mn log2 q is the size of the database, λ is the security parameter, b > λ logN is the Merkle tree block size. Assume log2 q
is a constant.)
Server Communication Client
Strategy extern=T extern=F extern=T extern=F
Storage N +O(Nλ/b) O(λ) O (nλ)
C
om
p
u
t. Setup O(N) N + o(N) N O(N)
Audit N O(m+ nλ) O(m) O(λ(m+ n))
Read/Write O(b+ λ logN) O(b+ λ logN) O (b+ λ logN)
6.2 Formal protocol descriptions
Full definitions of the five algorithms, Init, Read, Write, Audit and Extract, as Algorithms 1 to 5, are
given below, incorporating the improvements on control vector storage from the previous subsection. They
include subcalls to the classical Merkle hash tree operations defined in Section 4.3.
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Then, a summary of the asymptotic costs can be found in Table 6.
Algorithm 1 Init(1λ,m, n, q, b,M, Strategy)
Input: 1λ;m,n, q, b ∈ N; M ∈ Fm×nq
Output: stS , stC
1: t← dλ/(log2 q)e ∈ N;
2: Client: s
$← Ftq with non-zero distinct elements {Secrets}
3: Client: Let U← [sji ]i=1...t,j=1...m ∈ Ft×mq
4: Client: V← UM ∈ Ft×nq {Secretly stored or externalized}
5: Both: (M, TM | rM)←MTInit(1λ, b,M)
6: if (Strategy = externalization) then
7: Client: K
$← K;
8: Client: W← EK(V) ∈ Ct×nq ;
9: Client: sends m,n, q,M,W to the Server;
10: Both: (W, TW | rW)←MTInit(1λ, b,W)
11: Server: stS ← (m,n, q,M, TM, Strategy,W, TW);
12: Client: stC ← (m,n, q, t, s, rM, Strategy,K, rW);
13: else
14: Client: sends m,n, q,M to the Server;
15: Server: stS ← (m,n, q,M, TM, Strategy);
16: Client: stC ← (m,n, q, t, s, rM, Strategy,V);
17: end if
Algorithm 2 Read(stS , stC , i, j)
Input: stS ,stC , i ∈ [1..m], j ∈ [1..n]
Output: Mij or reject
1: Both: Mij ←MTVerifiedRead(M, TM | (i, j), rM)
2: Client: return Mij
6.3 Security
Before we begin the full security proof, we need the following technical lemma to prove that the Extract
algorithm succeeds with high probability. The proof of this lemma is a straightforward application of Chernoff
bounds.
Lemma 5. Let λ, n ≥ 1 and suppose 2e balls are thrown independently and uniformly into q bins at random.
If e = 2n+ 12λ and q ≥ 8e, then with probability at least exp(−λ), the number of non-empty bins is at least
e+ n.
Proof. Let B1, B2, . . . , B2e be random variables for the indices of bins that each ball goes into. Each is a
uniform independent over the q bins.
Let X1,2, X1,3, . . . , X2e−1,2e be
(
2e
2
)
random variables for each pair of indices i, j with i 6= j, such that Xi,j
equals 1 iff Bi = Bj . Each Xi,j is a therefore Bernoulli trial with E[Xi,j ] = 1q , and the sum X =
∑
i6=j Xi,j
is the number of pairs of balls which go into the same bin.
We will use a Chernoff bound on the probability that X is large. Note that the random variables Xi,j are
not independent, but they are negatively correlated: when any Xi,j equals 1, it only decreases the conditional
expectation of any other Xi′,j′ . Therefore, by convexity, we can treat the Xi,j ’s as independent in order to
obtain an upper bound on the probability that X is large.
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Algorithm 3 Write(stS , stC , i, j,M′ij , Strategy)
Input: stS , stC , i ∈ [1..m], j ∈ [1..n],M′ij ∈ Fq
Output: st′S , st
′
C or reject
1: Both: (M′, T ′M |Mij , r′M)←MTVerifiedWrite(M, TM | (i, j),M′ij , rM)
2: if (Strategy = externalization) then
3: Both: W1..t,j ←MTVerifiedRead(W, TW | (1..t, j), rW)
4: Client: V1..t,j ← DK(W1..t,j) ∈ Ftq;
5: end if
6: Client: Let U1..t,i ← [sik]k=1...t ∈ Ftq
7: Client: V′1..t,j ← V1..t,j + U1..t,i(M′ij −Mij) ∈ Ftq;
8: if (Strategy = externalization) then
9: Client: W′1..t,j ← EK(V′1..t,j) ∈ Ctq
10: Both: (W′, T ′W |W1..t,j , r′W)←MTVerifiedWrite(W, TW | (1..t, j),W′1..t,j , rW)
11: Server: Update st′S using M
′, T ′M,W
′, and T ′W
12: Client: Update st′C using r
′
M and r
′
W
13: else
14: Server: Update st′S using M
′ and T ′M
15: Client: Update st′C using r
′
M and V
′
16: end if
Observe that E[X] =
(
2e
2
)
/q < e/4. A standard consequence of the Chernoff bound on sums of indepen-
dent indicator variables tells us that Pr[X ≥ 2E[X]] ≤ exp(−E[X]/3); see for example [30, Theorem 4.1] or
[22, Theorem 1].
Substituting the bound on E[x] then tells us that Pr[X ≥ e/2] ≤ exp(−e/12) < exp(−λ). That is, with
high probability, fewer than e/2 pair of balls share the same bin. If nk denotes the number of bins with k
balls, the number of non-empty bins is
q∑
k=2
nk + 2e−
q∑
k=2
knk = 2e−
q∑
k=2
(k − 1)nk
≥ 2e−
q∑
k=2
(
k
2
)
nk >
3
2
e,
which completes the proof.
We now proceed to the main result of the paper.
Theorem 6 (Appendix B). Let λ,m, n ∈ N, Fq a finite field satisfying q ≥ 16n+ 96λ be parameters for our
PoR scheme. Then the protocol composed of:
• the Init operations in Algorithm 1;
• the Read operations in Algorithm 2;
• the Write operations in Algorithm 3;
• the Audit operations in Algorithm 4; and
• the Extract operation in Algorithm 5 with e = 2n+ 12λ
satisfies correctness, adaptive authenticity and retrievability as defined in Definitions 1 to 3.
6.4 Public verifiability
These algorithms can also be adapted to support public verifiability. There a first client (now called the
Writer) is authorized to run the Init, Write, Read and Audit algorithms, while a second client (now called
the Verifier) can only run the last two. The idea is to provide equality testing without deciphering. In a group
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Algorithm 4 Audit(stS , stC , Strategy)
Input: stS , stC
Output: accept or reject
1: Client: ρ
$← Fq;
2: Client: sends ρ to the Server;
3: Let xᵀ ← [ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn]
4: Server: y←Mx ∈ Fmq ; {M from stS}
5: Server: sends y to Client;
6: if (Strategy = externalization) then
7: Both: W←MTVerifiedRead(W, TW | (1..t, 1..n), rW);
8: Client: V← DK(W) ∈ Ft×nq
9: end if
10: Client: Let U← [sji ]i=1...t,j=1...m ∈ Ft×mq
11: if (Uy = Vx) then
12: Client: return accept
13: else
14: Client: return reject
15: end if
Algorithm 5 Extract(stC , (x1,y1), . . . , (xe,ye))
Input: stC and e ≥ 2n+ 12λ successful audit transcripts (xi,yi)
Output: M or fail
1: `1, . . . , `k ← indices of distinct challenge vectors x`i
2: if k < n then
3: return fail
4: end if {Now X is Vandermonde with distinct points}
5: Form matrix X← [x`1 | · · · |x`n ] ∈ Fn×nq
6: Form matrix Y ← [y`1| · · · |y`n] ∈ Fm×nq
7: Compute M← Y X−1
8: return M
where the discrete logarithm is hard this can be achieved while preserving security thanks to the additive
homomorphic property of exponentiation. For instance on the Externalized strategy the modifications are:
1. A group G of prime order p and generator g is build.
2. Init, in Algorithm 1, is run identically, except for two modifications. First that W is ciphered in G:
W ← EK(V) = gV. Second, that the Writer also publishes an encryption of U as: K ← gU over an
authenticated channel.
3. All the verifications of the Merkle tree root in Algorithms 2 to 4 remain unchanged, but the Writer
must publish the new roots of the trees after each Write also over an authenticated and timestamped
channel to the Verifier.
4. Updates to the control vector, in Algorithm 3 are performed homomorphically, without deciphering
W: the Writer computes in clear, ∆← (M′ij −Mij)U1..t,i, then updates W′1..t,j ←W1..t,j · g∆.
5. The dotproduct verification, in Algorithm 4 is performed also homomorphically: Ky
?
= Wx.
These modifications give rise to the following Theorem 7. This theorem and the associated security
assumptions are formalized and proven in Appendix D.
Theorem 7. Under LIP security in a group G of prime order p ≥ max{16n + 96λ,m22λ}, where discrete
logarithms are hard to compute, our Protocol can be modified in order to not only satisfy correctness, adaptive
authenticity and retrievability but also public verifiability.
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7 Detailed state of the art
PDP schemes, first introduced by [5] in 2007, originally only considered static data storage. The original
scheme was later adapted to allow dynamic updates by [16] and has since seen numerous performance
improvements. However, PDPs only guarantee (probabilistically) that a large fraction of the data was not
altered; a single block deletion or alteration is likely to go undetected in an audit.
PoR schemes, first introduced at the same CCS conference in 2007 by [24], provide a stronger guarantee
of integrity: namely, that any small alteration to the data is likely to be detected. In this paper, we use the
term PoR to refer to any scheme which provides this stronger level of recoverability guarantee.
PoR and PDP are usually constructed as a collection of phases in order to initialize the data storage,
to access it afterwards and to audit the server’s storage. Dynamic schemes also propose a modification of
subsets of data, called write or update.
Since 2007, different schemes have been proposed to serve different purposes such as data confidentiality,
data integrity, or data availability, but also freshness and fairness. Storage efficiency, communication effi-
ciency and reduction of disk I/O have improved with time. Some schemes are developed for static data (no
update algorithm) , others extend their audit algorithm for public verification, still others require a finite
number of Audits and Updates. For a complete taxonomy on recent PoR schemes, see [37] and references
therein.
For our purpose, we have identified two main storage outsourcing type of approaches: those which
minimizes the storage overhead and those which minimize the client and server computation. For each
approach, we specify in Table 7 which one meets various requirements such as whether or not they are
dynamic, if they can answer an unbounded number of queries and what is the extra storage they require.
Table 7: Attributes of some selected schemes
PoR Number of Extra
Protocol capable audits updates Storage
Sebe´ [32] X ∞ 0 o(N)
Ateniese et al. [5] X ∞ 0 o(N)
Ateniese et al. [6] X O(1) O(1) o(N)
Storj [36] X O(1) O(1) o(N)
Juels et al. [24] X O(1) 0 O(N)
Lavauzelle et al. [27] X ∞ 0 O(N)
Stefanov et al. [35] X ∞ ∞ O(N)
Cash et al. [10] X ∞ ∞ O(N)
Shi et al. [34] X ∞ ∞ O(N)
Here X ∞ ∞ o(N)
7.1 Low storage overhead
The schemes of Ateniese et al. [5] or Sebe´ et al. [32] are in the PDP model. Both of them have a storage
overhead in o(N). They use the RSA protocol in order to construct homomorphic authenticators, so that a
successful audit guaranties data possession on some selected blocks. When all the blocks are selected, the
audit is deterministic but the computation cost is high. So in practice, [5] minimizes the file block accesses,
the computation on the server, and the client-server communication. For one audit on at most f blocks,the
S-PDP protocol of [5] gives the costs seen in Table 8. A robust auditing integrates S-PDP with a forward
error-correcting codes to mitigate arbitrary small file corruption. Nevertheless, if the server passes one audit,
it guarantees only that a portion of the data is correct.
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Table 8: S-PDP on f blocks : The file M is composed of N/b blocks of bit-size b. The computation is made
mod Q, where Q is the product of two large prime numbers.
Server Communication Client
Storage N +m O(1)
C
o
m
p
u
t. Setup N + f O(bf)
Audit O(f) ← O(1) O(f)
→ O(1)
Later, Ateniese et al. [6] proposed a scheme secure under the random oracle model based on hash
functions and symmetric keys. It has an efficient update algorithm but uses tokens which impose a limited
number of audits or updates.
Alternatively, verifiable computing can be used to go through the whole database with Merkel hash trees,
as in [7, §6]. The latter proposition however comes with a large overhead in homomorphic computations and
does not provide an Audit mechanism. Verifiable computing can provide an audit mechanism, as sketched
in the following paper [17], but then it is not dynamic anymore.
Storj [36] (version 2) is a very different approach also based on Merkel hash trees. It is a dynamic PoR
protocol with bounded Audits and updates. The storage is encrypted and cut into m blocks of size b. For
each block and for a selection of σ salts, a Merkel Hash tree with σ leaves is constructed. The efficiency of
Storj is presented Table 9.
Table 9: Storj-V2: The file M is composed of N/b blocks of bit-size b. σ is the number of salts.
Server Communication Client
Storage N+O(N
b
σ) O(N
b
σ)
C
o
m
p
u
t. Setup ← N+O(N
b
σ) O(N+N
b
σ)
Audit O(N
b
σ) ← O(N
b
) O(N
b
log σ)
→ O(N
b
log σ)
Update O(σ) ← O(1)+b O(log σ)
→ O(log σ)
7.2 Fast audits but large extra storage
PoR methods based on block erasure encoding are a class of methods which guarantee with a high probability
that the client’s entire data can be retrieved. The idea is to check the authenticity of a number of erasure
encoding blocks during the data recovery step but also during the audit algorithm. Those approaches will
not detect a small amount of corrupted data. But the idea is that if there are very few corrupted blocks,
they could be easily recovered via the error correcting code.
Lavauzelle et al., [27] proposed a static PoR. The Init algorithm consists in encoding the file using a
lifted q-ary Reed-Solomon code and encrypting it with a block-cipher. The Audit algorithm checks if one
word of q blocks belongs to a set of Reed-Solomon code words. This algorithm has to succeed a sufficient
number of times to ensure with a high probability that the file can be recovered. Its main drawback is that
it requires an initialization quadratic in the database size. For a large data file of several terabytes this
becomes intractable.
In addition to a block erasure code, PoRSYS of Juels et al. [24] use block encryptions and sentinels in
order to store static data with a cloud server. Shacham and Waters [33] use authenticators to improve the
audit algorithm. A publicly verifiable scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman problem in bilinear groups is also
proposed.
Stefanov et al. [35] were the first to consider a dynamic PoR scheme. Later improvements by Cash et
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al. or Shi et al. [10, 34] allow for dynamic updates and reduce the asymptotic complexity (see Table 10).
However, these techniques rely on computationally-intensive tools, such as locally decodable codes and
Oblivious RAM (ORAM), and incur at least a 1.5x, or as much as 10x, overhead on the size of remote
storage.
Recent variants include Proof of Data Replication or Proof of Data Reliability, where the error correction
is performed by the server instead of the client [3, 38]. Some use a weaker, rational, attacker model [29, 11],
and in all of them the client thus has to also be able to verify the redundancy; but we do not know of
dynamic versions of these.
Table 10: Shi et al. [34]: The file M is composed of Nb blocks of bit-size b.
Server Communication Client
Storage O(N) O(b)
C
o
m
p
u
t. Setup ← N +O(N
b
) O(N logN)
Audit O(b logN) O(b+ logN) O(b+ logN)
Update O(b logN) O(b+ logN) O(logN)
Table 11: Comparison of our low server storage protocol with that of Shi et al. [34].
Shi Here Here
et al. [34] extern=T extern=F
Server extra-
storage
5N o(N) o(N)
Server audit cost O(b logN) N+o(N) N+o(N)
Communication O(b+ logN) O(
√
N) O(Nα)
Client audit cost O(b+ logN) O(
√
N) O(N1−α)
Client storage O(b) O(1) O(N1−α)
Table 11 compares the additional server storage and audit costs between [34] and the two variants of our
protocol: the first one saving on communication, and the second one, externalizing the storage of the secret
audit matrix V . In the former case, an arbitrary parameter α can be used in the choice of the dimensions:
m = Nα and n = N1−α/ log2(q). This balances between the communication cost O(N
α) and the Client
computation and storage O(N1−α).
Note that efficient solutions to PoR for dynamic data do not consider the confidentiality of the file M ,
but assume that the user can encrypt its data in a prior step if needed.
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A Lower bound proof
Theorem 4 (Appendix A). Consider any Proof of Retrievability scheme which stores an arbitrary database
of N bits, uses at most N + s bits of persistent memory on the server, c bits of persistent memory on the
client, and requires at most t steps to perform an audit. Assuming s ≥ 0, then either t > N4 , or
(s+ c)
t
log2 t
≥ N
12
.
Proof. First observe that N = 0 and t = 0 are both trivial cases: either the theorem is always true, or the
PoR scheme is not correct. So we assume always that N ≥ 1 and t ≥ 1.
By way of contradiction, suppose a valid PoR scheme exists with s ≥ 0, t ≤ N4 , and
(s+ c)
t
log2 t
<
N
12
. (6)
Following the definitions in Section 2, we consider only the Audit and Extract algorithms. The Audit
algorithm may be randomized and, by our assumption, examines at most t bits of the underlying memory.
At any point in an honest run of the algorithm, the server stores a (N + s)-bit string stS , the client stores
a c-bit string stC , and the client virtual memory in the language of [10] is the unique N -bit string M such
that IsValid(stC , stS ,M).
Define a map φ : {0, 1}N+s+c → {0, 1}N as follows. Given any pair (stC , stS) of length-N + s and length-
c bit strings, run Extract(stC , Audit1(stC , stS), . . . , Audite(stC , stS)) repeatedly over all possible choices
of randomness, and record the majority result. By Definition 1, we have that φ(stC , stS) = M whenever
IsValid(stC , stS ,M).
Observe that this map φ must be onto, and consider, for any N -bit data string M , the preimage φ−1(M),
which is the set of client/server storage configurations (stC , stS) such that φ(stC , stS) = M . By a pigeon-hole
argument, there must exist some string M0 such that
#φ−1(M0) ≤ 2
N+s+c
2N
= 2s+c. (7)
Informally, M0 is the data which is most easily corrupted.
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We now define an adversary S¯ for the game of Definition 3 as follows: On the first step, S¯ chooses M0
as the initial database, and uses this in the Init algorithm to receive server state stS . Next, S¯ chooses k
indices uniformly at random from the stS of (N + s) bits (where k is a parameter to be defined next), and
flips those k bits in stS to obtain a corrupted state st′S . Finally, S¯ runs the honest Audit algorithm 2e times
on step 3 of the security game, using this corrupted state st′S .
What remains is to specify how many bits k the adversary should randomly flip, so that most of the
2e runs of the Audit algorithm succeed, but the following call to Extract does not produce the original
database M0.
Let
k =
⌊
N + s
4t
⌋
. (8)
From the assumptions that s ≥ 0 and t ≤ N4 , we have that k ≥ 1.
Let stC be the initial client state (which is unknown to S¯) in the attack above with initial database
M0. From the correctness requirement (Definition 1) and the definition of t in our theorem, running
Audit(stC , stS) must always succeed after examining at most t bits of stS . Therefore, if the k flipped
bits in the corrupted server storage st′S are not among the (at most) t bits examined by the Audit algo-
rithm, it will still pass. By the union bound, the probability that a single run of Audit(stC , st′S) passes is at
least
1− t k
N + s
≥ 3
4
.
This means that the expected number of failures in running 2e audits is e2 , so the Markov inequality tells us
that the adversary S¯ successfully passes at least e audits (as required) with probability at least 12 .
We want to examine the probability that φ(stC , st′S) 6= M0, and therefore that the final call to Extract
in the security game does not produce M0 and the adversary wins with high probability. Because there are(
N+s
k
)
distinct ways to choose the k bits to form corrupted storage st′S , and from the upper bound of (7)
above, the probability that φ(stC , st′S) 6= M0 is at least
1− 2
s+c − 1(
N+s
k
) . (9)
Trivially, if s + c = 0, then this probability equals 1. Otherwise, from the original assumption (6), and
because log2(4t)/(2t) ≤ 1 for all positive integers t, we have
s+ c+ 2 ≤ 3(s+ c) < N log2 t
4t
≤
(
N
4t
− 1
)
log2(4t).
Therefore (
N + s
k
)
≥
(
N + s
k
)k
> (4t)
N+s
4t −1 ≥ 2s+c+2.
Returning to the lower bound in (9), the probability that the final Extract does not return M0 is at
least 34 . Combining with the first part of the proof, we see that, with probability at least
3
8 , the attacker
succeeds: at least e runs of Audit(stC , st′S) pass, but the final run of Extract fails to produce the correct
database M0.
B Security proof
Theorem 6 (Appendix B). Let λ,m, n ∈ N, Fq a finite field satisfying q ≥ 16n+ 96λ be parameters for our
PoR scheme. Then the protocol composed of:
• the Init operations in Algorithm 1;
• the Read operations in Algorithm 2;
• the Write operations in Algorithm 3;
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• the Audit operations in Algorithm 4; and
• the Extract operation in Algorithm 5 with e = 2n+ 12λ
satisfies correctness, adaptive authenticity and retrievability as defined in Definitions 1 to 3.
Proof. Correctness comes from the correctness of the Merkle hash tree algorithms, and from the fact that,
when all parties are honest, Uy = UMx = Vx.
For authenticity, first consider the secret control block vectors U and V. On the one hand, in the local
storage strategy, U and V never travel and all the communications by the Client in all the algorithms are
independent of these secrets. On the other hand, in the externalization strategy, U never travels and V
is kept confidential by the IND-CPA symmetric encryption scheme with key K known only by the client.
Therefore, from the point of view of the server, it is equivalent, in both strategies, to consider either that these
secrets are computed during initialization as stated, or that they are only determined after the completion
of any of the operations.
Now suppose that the server sends an incorrect audit response z 6= Mx which the Client fails to reject,
and let Let f ∈ Fq[X] be the polynomial with degree at most m − 1 whose coefficients are the entries of
(z−Mx). Then from (4) and (5) in the prior discussion, each of the randomly-chosen values s1, . . . , st is a
root of this polynomial f . Because f has at most m− 1 distinct roots, the chance that a single si is a root
of f is at most (m− 1)/q, and therefore the probability that all f(s1) = · · · = f(st) = 0, is at most (m/q)t.
From the choice of t = dλ/ log2(q/m)e, the chance that the Client fails to reject an incorrect audit
response is at most 2−λ, which completes the proof of authenticity (Definition 2).
For retrievability, we need to prove that Algorithm 5 succeeds with high probability on the last step
of the security game from Definition 3. Because of the authenticity argument above, all successful audit
transcripts are valid with probability 1 − negl(λ); that is, each y = Mx in the input to Algorithm 5.
This Extract algorithm can find an invertible Vandermonde matrix X ∈ Fn×nq , and thereby recover M
successfully, whenever at least n of the values ρ from challenge vectors x are distinct.
Therefore the security game becomes essentially this: The experiment runs the honest Audit algorithm
2e = 4n + 24λ times, each time choosing a value ρ for the challenge uniformly at random from Fq. The
adversary must then select e of these audits to succeed, and the adversary wins the game by selecting e of
the 2e random audit challenges which contain fewer than n distinct ρ values.
This is equivalent to the balls-and-bins game of Lemma 5, which shows that the Extract algorithm
succeeds with probability at least 1− exp(−λ) > 1− 2−λ for any selection of e out of 2e random audits.
C Requirements for a Merkle hash tree implementation and overview
of the formalized protocol with the externalization strategy
Table 12 presents an overview of the fully formalized protocol. This is a merge of the algorithms in Section 6,
for the Externalization strategy. Its correctness, authenticity and retrievability are proven in Theorem 6.
It uses two Merkle hash trees, one for the database M and one for the externalized control vectors W. We
here give more details on the functions required in Section 4.3 for the handling of the Merkle hash trees. A
Merkle tree [28] is a tree where the value associated with a node is a one-way function of the values of the
node’s children. We here consider only binary Merkle Hash trees.
For our purpose, an implementation of such trees must provide the following algorithms:
• T ←MTCreateTree(X) creates a Merkle hash tree from a database X.
• r ←MTRootFromLeaves(X) computes the root of the Merkle hash tree of the whole database X.
• (L1, L2) ←MTElementAndPath(index, range,X, T ) is an algorithm providing the client with the
requested list L1 of contiguous leaf elements Xi=index,j∈range, together with
the list L2 constituted by the blocks containing Xi=index,j∈range and by the corresponding lists of
Merkle tree uncles.
• r ← MTRootFromPath(index, range, L1, L2) computes the root of the Merkle hash tree from a
list L1 of contiguous leaf elements and the associated blocks and path of uncles L2.
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Table 12: Externalized PoR
Server Communications Client
Init
DB with N bits M ∈ Fm×nq
1λ,m,n,q,b←− rM ←MTRootFromLeaves(M)
Stores M
M←− t← dλ/ log2(q)e
TM ←MTCreateTree(M) s $← St ⊆ Ftq
Form U← [sji ]i=1...t,j=1...m ∈ Ft×mq
K
$← K
Stores W
W←− V← UM, W← EK(V)
TW ←MTCreateTree(W) rW ←MTRootFromLeaves(W)
discard M,V,W
Read
i,j←−
Mij (Mi,j , LM)←MTElementAndPath(i, j,M, TM) Mij ,LM−→ rM ?= MTRootFromPath(i, j,Mij , LM)
Write rM ←MTRootFromPath(i, j,M′ij , LM)
M′ij
(W1..t,j , LW)←MTElementAndPath(1..t, j,W, TW) W1..t,j ,LW−→ rW ?= MTRootFromPath(1..t, j,W1..t,j , LW)
V1..t,j ← DK(W1..t,j)
V1..t,j ← V1..t,j + (M′ij −Mij)U1..t,i
Mij ←M′i,j
M′ij ,W
′
1..t,j←− W′1..t,j ← EK(V1..t,j)
W1..t,j ←W′1..t,j rW ←MTRootFromPath(1..t, j,W′1..t,j , LW)
Audit
Form x← [r, r2, . . . , rn]ᵀ r←− r $← S ⊆ Fq
y ←Mx y,W−→ rW ?= MTRootFromLeaves(W)
V← DK(W)
Form x← [r, r2, . . . , rn]ᵀ
Uy
?
= Vx
The requirements are thus that:
∀i, r,X,MTRootFromLeaves(X) =
MTRootFromPath (i, r,
MTElementAndPath(i, r,X,MTCreateTree(X)) ) (10)
As mentioned in Section 4.3, we need to consider two formats which contain the same N bits of data:
• A row-major matrix M ∈ Fm×nq where N = m × n × blog2qc. In this format, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
1 ≤ j ≤ n, Mij ∈M is named a slot.
• The outsourced data can also be represented as a single continuous file F of dN/be equal sized blocks:
B1, B2, . . . , BdN/be, of size b. This blocking is independent of that used for M .
Then, let H be a hash function, {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2λ, for a security parameter λ ≥ 128, that is a hash
function on more than 256 bits.
For instance, for MTElementAndPath, the client wants to read the slot Mij . This corresponds to the
block position k =
⌈
(i−1)n+j
b
⌉
. She more precisely receives from the server Mij , the block Bk containing
Mij and the set of hash tree uncles Lk corresponding to Bk. She can then check the root of the hash tree
with Bk and Lk.
Note that in practice, the algorithms for handling Merkle tree operations might need slightly more
inputs (taken implicitly from the respective states of the Client and the Server) than those mentioned in
Equation (10). In the following, whenever needed, these extra inputs will be added to the specification.
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To be able to run this algorithm, the Server must therefore handle the Merkle hash tree associated to a
database. This means having access to an algorithm creating the hash tree, and another algorithm to access
the nodes. For these two tasks we use classical implementations:
• More precisely, T ←MTCreateTree(X) computes all the nodes of the Merkle hash tree of the whole
database X viewed as an array of blocks of size b. A possibility is then to use [23, Algorithm 1].
• h ← MTNode(level, index, T ) provides access to the node numbered index at the required level of
the tree. If all the nodes are stored by the Server this is just a labelling of all these nodes. Another
possibility for the server is to have a time/memory trade-off as in [23, Algorithm 3]. The idea is to
store only the root of subtrees and to recompute hashes within subtrees.
For this, the server arranges hashes of the blocks as leafs in a binary hash tree of depth δ satisfying:
δ =
⌈
log2
(
N
b
)⌉
. (11)
The nodes above the leafs are hashes of their two children.
The size of this tree T is
∑d
i=1 2λ2
i = 2λ(2δ+1−1) < 8λb = 8λNb . This size is negligible if 1024 ≤ 8λ b.
For instance the following choice for b gives an always negligible size: b = O (λ log(N)).
Assuming the hash function is linear to compute, the cost of producing the tree is O(N). This additional
algorithm also immediatly gives a possible implementation for the computation of the root: build the tree
and output its root as in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 rX ←MTRootFromLeaves(X)
Input: a data base X - System parameter: b -
Output: the root of the Merkle Hash tree rX
1: T ←MTCreateTree(X);
2: return root of T .
Now, to fetch a slot and compute the path of uncles, one just needs to have access to the tree nodes, as
illustrated in Algorithm 7. The case of a range of contiguous slots is similar: consider just the uncles of the
sub-tree linking all these contiguous blocks.
Algorithm 7 (Xij , L)←MTElementAndPath(i, j,X, T )
Input: i ∈ [1..m], j ∈ [1..n], X the database, T the Merkle hash tree - System parameter: n,m, b -
Output: Xij and L the list constituted by the block containing Xij and by the corresponding list of Merkle
tree hashes.
1: k ←
⌈
(i−1)n+j
b
⌉
; B ← k-th block of X; L← {B};
2: for i = 1..depth(T ) do
3: if k is odd then
4: L← L ∪ {MTNode(i, k − 1, T )};
5: else
6: L← L ∪ {MTNode(i, k + 1, T )};
7: end if
8: k ← bk/2c;
9: end for
10: return (Xi,j , L)
Finally, to check the correctness of a slot Xij , we need the block Bk and the list of δ uncles and to recom-
pute the root, only from this list and the block. Therefore, a possible implementation of this recomputation
is given in Algorithm 8, first with a single block. Here also the case of a range of contiguous slots is similar.
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Algorithm 8 r ←MTRootFromPath(i, j,Xi,j , L)
Input: i ∈ [1..m], j ∈ [1..n], a slot Xij , a list L constituted by the block Bk and the corresponding list of
hashes - System parameter: n,m, b -
Output: r the root of the Merkle Hash tree.
1: B ← L[1]; `← (i− 1)n+ j mod b;
2: B` ← Xi,j ; {Update with the new value}
3: r ← H(B); k ←
⌈
(i−1)n+j
b
⌉
.
4: for i = 2..length(L) do
5: if the (i− 1)th bit of k is 1 then
6: r ← H(L[i], r);
7: else
8: r ← H(r, L[i])
9: end if
10: end for
11: return r
The idea is to consider L as the union of the list of uncles and the block itself as its first element. Then the
new slot Xij to be considered replaces (for instance after a write operation) the old slot within the block Bk
and the root is computed from this new block and the path of hashes.
The cost to recompute the root is that of hashing one block, and then of computing δ additional hashes
of two hashes, that is O(b+ δλ). The difficulty for an attacker to pass this integrity test is that of the second
preimage of the hash function, see [8], e.g., for more details.
From these, it is then easy to implement the API of Section 4.3: Table 13 propose an overview of the
implementation of MTInit, MTVerifiedRead and MTVerifiedWrite.
Table 13: Implementation of MTInit, MTVerifiedRead and MTVerifiedWrite.
• MTInit(1λ, b,X) 7→ (rM |M,TM )
Verifier rM ←MTRootFromLeaves(M)
Comm. (M) ↓
Server TM ←MTCreateTree(M)
• MTVerifiedRead(i, j, rM |M,TM ) 7→Mi,j
V. rM
?
= MTRootFromPath(Mi,j , i, j, LM )
C. (i, j) ↓ (Mi,j , LM ) ↑
S. MTElementAndPath(i, j,M, TM )→ (Mi,j , LM )
• MTVerifiedWrite(i, j,M ′i,j , rM |M,TM )
After MTVerifiedRead(i, j, rM |M,TM ):
V. rM ←MTRootFromPath(M ′i,j , i, j, LM )
C.
(
M ′i,j
) ↓
S. updates M , TM
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D Public verifiability proof
Protocol 14 presents the modifications of Section 6.4 within the full description of the algorithms. There and
in the following, gA, for a matrix A, denotes the exponentiation coefficient by coefficient. Similarly, WB, as
in (gA)B, is actually WB = gAB, but this can be computed in the exponents if needed:(
g[ a c ]
)[ b d ]ᵀ
= (ga)
b
(gc)
d
= gab+cd.
Table 14: Publicly verifiable externalized PoR (server operations are those of Table 12)
Comm. Client
Init
group G of order p and gen. g
M ∈ Zm×np with N bits
1λ,m,n,p,b←− rM ←MTRootFromLeaves(M)
M←− t← dλ/ log2(p)e
s
$← St ⊆ Ztp
Form U← [sji ]i=1...t,j=1...m ∈ Zt×mp
W←− V← UM, W← gV
rW ←MTRootFromLeaves(W)
publish rM, rW and K = g
U
discard M,V,W
public
i,j←−
Read
Mij ,LM−→ rM ?= MTRootFromPath(i, j,Mij , LM)
Write
W1..t,j ,LW−→ rM ←MTRootFromPath(i, j,M′ij , LM)
M′ij
rW
?
= MTRootFromPath(1..t, j,W1..t,j , LW)
∆← (M′ij −Mij)U1..t,i
M′ij ,W
′
1..t,j←− W′1..t,j ←W1..t,j · g∆
rW ←MTRootFromPath(1..t, j,W′1..t,j , LW)
publish rM and rW
public
r←− r $← S ⊆ Z∗p
Audit
y,W−→ rW ?= MTRootFromLeaves(W)
Form x← [r, r2, . . . , rn]ᵀ
Ky
?
= Wx
Under Linearly Independent Polynomial (LIP) Security [1, Theorem 3.1], Protocol 14 adds public verifi-
ability to our dynamic proof of retrievability. Indeed, LIP security states that in a group G of prime order,
the values (gP1(s), . . . , gPm(s)) are indistinguishable from a random tuple of the same size, when P1, . . . , Pm
are linearly independent multivariate polynomials of bounded degree and s is the secret. Therefore, in our
modified protocol, each row gUi =
(
gs
j
i
)
j=1..m
is indistinguishable from a random tuple of size m since the
polynomials Xj , j = 1..m are independent distinct commutative monomials. Then the idea is thus to reduce
breaking the public verifiability to breaking a discrete logarithm. For this, the discrete logarithm to break
will be put inside U.
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Theorem 7. Under LIP security in a group G of prime order p ≥ max{16n + 96λ,m22λ}, where discrete
logarithms are hard to compute, our Protocol can be modified in order to not only satisfy correctness, adaptive
authenticity and retrievability but also public verifiability.
Proof. In Table 14, Correctness is just to verify the dotproducts, but in the exponents: Ky = gUy = gUMx =
Wx.
Now for Authenticity: first, any incorrect W is detected by the Merkle hash tree verification. Second,
with a correct W, any incorrect y is also detected with high probability, as shown next.
Suppose that there exist an algorithm A(M,K,W, r) that can defeat the verification with a fake y, with
probability . That is the algorithm produces y¯, with y¯ 6= y = Mx, such that we have the t equations:
Ky = Wx = Ky¯. (12)
We start with the case t = 1. Let A = ga be a DLOG problem.
Then we follow the proof +of [15, Lemma 1] and simulate Init via the following inputs to the attacker:
• r $← S ⊆ Z∗p and let x = [r, r2, . . . , rn]ᵀ;
• Sample M $← Sm×n ⊆ Zm×np and U $← Sm ⊆ Zmp .
• Randomly select also k ∈ 1..m and, then, compute K = gUAek , so that K = gU+aek , where ek is the
k-th canonical vector of Zmp .
• Under LIP security [1, Theorem 3.1], K is indistinguishable from the distribution of the protocol (gsji ).
• finally compute W = KM, thus also indistinguishable from the distribution of the protocol.
To simulate any number of occurences of Write, it is then sufficient to randomly select M′ij . Then
compute and send to the attacker: W′1..t,j ←W1..t,j ·K
M′ij−Mij
1..t,i .
After that, the attacker answers with y¯ 6= y satisfying Equation (12). This is g(U+aek)y¯ = g(U+aek)Mx,
equivalent to:
(U + aek)(y¯ −Mx) ≡ 0 mod p. (13)
Since y¯ 6= y mod p, then there is at least one index 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that y¯j 6= yj mod p. Since k is
randomly chosen from 1..m, the probability that y¯k 6= yk mod p is at least 1/m. If this is the case then
with z = y¯− y, we have zk 6= 0 mod p and Uz+ azk ≡ 0 mod p, so that a ≡ −z−1k Uz mod p. This means
that the discrete logarithm is broken with advantage ≥ /m.
Finally for any t ≥ 1 the proof is similar except that A is put in different columns for each of the t rows
of U. Thus the probability to hit it becomes ≥ t/m and the advantage is ≥ t/m ≥ /m. This gives the
requirement that p ≥ m22λ to sustain the best generic algorithms for DLOG.
Retreivability comes from the fact that y and x are public values. Therefore this part of the proof is
identical to that of Theorem 6.
Remarks 8. • If a writer wants to verify, she does not need to use K, nor to store it. Just compute Uy
directly, then check that gUy
?
= Wx.
• Even if U is structured, K hides this structure and therefore requires a larger storage. But any Verifier
can just fetch it and rW from the authenticated channel (for instance, electronically signed), as well
as fetch W from the Server, and perform the verification on the fly. Optimal communications for the
Verifier are then when m = O(
√
N) = n.
• To save some constant factors in communications, sending W or any of its updates W′i,j is not manda-
tory anymore: the Server can now recompute them directly from M and K.
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